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The Win-Win That Wasn’t: Managing to the Stock Market’s Negative
Effects on American Workers and Other Corporate Stakeholders
Aneil Kovvali* & Leo E. Strine, Jr.**
Easterbrook and Fischel’s work suggests that
society as a whole would achieve the best results if
corporate leaders focused only on raising stock
prices, leaving other institutions to tend to all
other interests.
But the idea that making
societally-important corporations govern to the
whims of the stock market would be a win-win for
investors, other corporate stakeholders, and our
society as a whole has proven incorrect. At bottom,
Easterbrook and Fischel failed to contend with the
real world realities that allow investors to profit by
shifting distributions and political power to
themselves, while shifting costs and risks to
workers, creditors, consumers, and taxpayers. In
this Article, prepared for a Symposium celebrating
Easterbrook and Fischel’s work, we evaluate
Easterbrook and Fischel’s predictions and find
that their failures are attributable to flaws in their
assumptions about corporate influence over the
political process and the extent to which
stockholders could not succeed unless the
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corporation respected other stakeholders and
society.

This festschrift highlights the bold and influential work of Frank
Easterbrook and Dan Fischel, scholarship that influenced a generation
or more of corporate law scholars and, perhaps more important, powerful
players in American corporate governance like institutional investors
and government policy makers. It is impossible to consider the path that
American corporate governance has taken without acknowledging the
impact of their thinking, and the ballast their arguments gave to those
who drove policies designed to make American public companies more
responsive to the immediate demands of the stock market and to tilt
governance towards one that would transmit the desires of stockholders,
particularly institutional investors with clout, more consistently and
rapidly into corporate policy.
In our reflection on their core corporate law scholarship, however,
we address a claim of Easterbrook and Fischel that in our view has, as a
matter of empirical and lived reality, turned out to be false. That
assumption was that if corporations were run to maximize the profits of
stockholders, and to be highly responsive to their demands, that would
benefit all of society. 1 The concept behind this was that stockholders
Easterbrook & Fischel explain this perspective in the opening chapter
of their book:
1

Society must choose whether to conscript the firm’s
strength (its tendency to maximize wealth) by changing the
prices it confronts or by changing its structure so that it is
less apt to maximize wealth. The latter choice will yield
less of both good ends than the former. . . . [M]aximizing
profits for equity investors assists the other ‘constituencies’
automatically. The participants in the venture play
complementary rather than antagonistic roles. In a
market economy each party to a transaction is better off.

2
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could only gain if all other stakeholders had their legitimate expectations
met, because stockholders were only residual claimants. 2 As a result, it
would benefit all if we ran corporations to their direction, because that
would grow the value of companies in the maximum way, for the benefit
of all stakeholders and society as a whole.
They thus posited a win-win, because there was no zero sum game.
Because of their uniquely vulnerable status as residual claimants,
without the greater protections of law and contractual precedence other
stakeholders had, stockholders supposedly could only win if the other
stakeholders did.
But this line of reasoning depends on certain assumptions being
true. First of all, it requires the corporation to be surrounded by effective
institutions that protect stakeholders, and prevent stockholders from
externalizing costs to them. The government must thus enact and
diligently enforce rules that set appropriate “prices” on socially
dangerous behavior. And corporations themselves must not use the
entrusted capital of others to act on the political process and to tilt the
Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, The Economic Structure of Corporate Law
38 (1991).
2
This point becomes clear in their discussion of corporate voting:
“[S]hareholders are the residual claimants to the firm’s
income. Creditors have fixed claims, and employees
generally negotiate compensation schedules in advance of
performance. The gains and losses from abnormally good
or bad performance are the lot of the shareholders, whose
claims stand last in line. As the residual claimants,
shareholders have the appropriate incentives (collective
choice problems not withstanding) to make discretionary
decisions. The firm should invest in new products, plants,
and so forth, until the gains and costs are identical at the
margin. . . . The shareholders receive most of the marginal
gains and incur most of the marginal costs. They therefore
have the right incentives to exercise discretion.”

Id. at 67-68.
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rules of the game away from those conditions, and toward ones where the
fair costs of doing business are shifted from equity investors to workers,
creditors, consumers, the environment, community members, and
taxpayers. Workers must be protected against unsafe and overly taxing
conditions of employment. Constraints must be set so that employers
cannot lowball vulnerable workers by paying poverty-level wages and
benefits and workers must be secure in their freedom to join together to
bargain and claim their fair share of corporate profits when negotiating
employment contracts. Communities and creditors who subsidize
corporations must genuinely be made whole before stockholders can
harvest. Product markets must ensure robust and healthy competition
that encourages corporations to do better by customers, and ensure that
products are safe and services are not fraudulent. And financial markets
must properly value the contributions and risks generated by
corporations, so that share prices reflect and reward sustainable, durable
growth, not short-term opportunities for harvest.
On those assumptions, stockholders can only gain if societal
interests are respected, because stockholders are only able to harvest if
those interests are first satisfied. Stockholders, as residual risk bearers,
are the most long-term oriented corporate constituency, and thus focus
on creating real social wealth. Running corporations for the benefit of
shareholders thus best aligns all interests.
In that imagined
environment, a corporate governance regime that encouraged ruthless
focus on what stockholders at any moment demand would lead to shared
prosperity.
But this is another way of saying that Easterbrook and Fischel
assumed all of the important problems away. We are told that
corporations and those that study them need not do the hard work of
finding ways to help society, because we can assume the existence of
other tools — other institutions and markets — that will ensure that
stockholder wealth generation is aligned with social wealth generation.
Over the past three decades, the benign assumptions Easterbrook
and Fischel used to slough off the worry that making corporations more
4
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responsive to investor power would hurt other stakeholders have turned
out to be untenable. The argued “win-win” has been a win for one
constituency — stockholders — and at best another — top management
— to the detriment of those most responsible for corporate success: the
workers. The investor class — now more powerful and represented
through muscular institutional investors — is far more privileged than
workers, and the change in gain sharing has driven inequality to levels
not seen since before the New Deal. 3 And evidence suggests that gains
to stockholders have come at the expense of debt holders, communities of
operation, and taxpayers, as corporations had shifted costs to them and
bubble behavior has caused the need for repeated societal bailouts of the
investor and financial class. 4
These shifts have been aided by the use of corporate political power
to decrease the external protections for corporate stakeholders and
society, and to free corporations to cater more to just their stockholder
constituency. With the power of that one constituency going way up and
the others, particularly workers, going way down, the distributional
effects have not been surprising, and are the opposite of the win-win
Easterbrook and Fischel predicted.
In this Article, we survey in brief the realities at odds with
Easterbrook and Fischel’s win-win prediction, and why there is
understandably a demand for rebalancing within corporate governance
itself to deal with the actual challenges that Easterbrook and Fischel
wished away.
This Article proceeds as follows.
Part I briefly introduces
Easterbrook and Fischel’s win-win argument. Part II sets forth the

See Estelle Sommeiller & Mark Price, The new gilded age, Economic
Policy Institute (July 19, 2018), https://www.epi.org/publication/the-new-gilded-ageincome-inequality-in-the-u-s-by-state-metropolitan-area-and-county/ (summarizing
study showing that share of income earned by the top 1% in 2007 was just shy of the
share of income earned by the top 1% in 1928).
4
See infra Part III.B-D.
3

5
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bottom line data on the win-win hypothesis, especially as it relates to
American workers, and shows how the reality has fallen far short of the
prediction. Part III shows that these failures were predictable in that
the world view of the larger school of which Easterbrook and Fischel are
leaders was hostile to the very institutions they argued would protect
other stakeholders.
Far from being dispersed and powerless,
stockholders have become increasingly powerful, aided by the
concentration of power in the hands of institutional investors who largely
pursue a shareholder primacy agenda. 5 The so-called Reagan revolution,
inspired by Milton Friedman and Lewis F. Powell, Jr. (later Justice
Powell) and supported by Easterbrook and Fischel, systematically sought
to reduce the effectiveness of government institutions that enforced the
rights of workers, minorities and women against discrimination in the
workforce and at the ballot box, that police the antitrust laws, and that
protected the environment. 6 Although within the corporate law domain,
Easterbrook and Fischel argued that corporations should focus just on
stockholder welfare and leave stakeholder and societal welfare to others,
corporations picked up on the encouragement of Powell and others and
used their power to undermine the legal rights of workers to join a union,
to erode the real level of the minimum wage, and to shift value from
workers to equity holders. 7 Corporations funded efforts to suppress
knowledge about climate change and to undercut efforts to clean up the
air and water of our nation. This corporate behavior underscores a
historical reality — corporations and their stockholders can profit for
decades, and longer, by business operations that are unsafe and unfair to
company workers, dangerous to company consumers, and that are
environmentally irresponsible. The stockholders of these companies
harvest all the time, but often leave injured consumers, a harmed
environment, communities with lost taxes, and workers with failed
pension plans bearing the actual residual risk. And financial markets
can suffer from serious blind spots and biases that prevent them from

5
6
7

See infra Part III.A.
See infra Part III.B.
See infra Part III.C.
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properly reflecting the full future effects of corporate decisions, and
requiring taxpayers and society as a whole to bail out the have’s, while
leaving the have not’s to bear the brunt of the costs. 8 For all these
reasons, an approach to corporate and securities laws that increases the
power of just one constituency — stockholders — and that decreases the
power of all others will generate results that should be obvious to any
realist: The constituency with the much greater power reaps more of the
rewards than the others and shifts more of the costs of generating those
rewards to the less powerful. Part IV concludes.
I.

Corporate Context

Easterbrook and Fischel’s key move is to define shareholder wealth
maximization as the basic objective of corporate law. Though they offer
several arguments, 9 a central plank of their platform is a win-win
hypothesis: “maximizing profits for equity investors assists the other
‘constituencies’ automatically.” 10 Workers, consumers, and communities
will all benefit from a system of corporate law that focuses exclusively on
shareholder wealth maximization.
This win-win prediction is central to their work. After using it to
justify their preferred end for corporate law, Easterbrook and Fischel go
on to propose particular means for achieving that end: a model of
corporate governance that would allow temporary majorities of

8

See infra Part IV.D.

Among other arguments, Easterbrook and Fischel declare that there is
an “expectation” that stockholders “have contracted for a promise to maximize longrun profits of the firm, which in turn maximizes the value of their stock.” Easterbrook
& Fischel, Economic Structure, supra note 1 at 36. They also suggest that any
alternative would increase agency costs and allow managers to evade accountability.
Id. at 38.
10
Id. at 38.
9

7
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shareholders to exercise control and make a quick buck with financial
schemes.11
But though they offer a clear win-win prediction, their explanation
of the basis for that prediction is muddled and superficial. First, they
suggest that “[t]he participants in the venture play complementary
rather than antagonistic roles. In a market economy each party to a
transaction is better off. A successful firm provides jobs for workers and
goods and services for consumers.” 12 Of course, this argument cannot be
taken too seriously, or too far. If these constituencies would all benefit
from the same corporate conduct, it should not matter whether corporate
managers are directed to serve shareholders or other constituencies. All
constituencies should agree on what is to be done in their mutual interest
and all could share in power over corporate decisionmaking. Because
history suggests that business leaders resist giving other stakeholders a
say, and because the history of the laboring class before regulation
suggests it is possible for centuries to extract wealth from the toil of the
many, we take the more traditional view that power matters and those
with it tend to direct gains toward themselves. Within American
corporate law, only one constituency, stockholders, had real clout over
management when The Economic Structure of Corporate Law was
written, and Easterbrook and Fischel argued that the stockholders
should be made even more powerful.
Second, they suggest that “[w]ealthy firms provide better working
conditions and clean up their outfalls; high profits produce social wealth
that strengthens the demand for cleanliness.”13 This mechanism is again
unclear. It is reasonable to believe that some of the more profitable firms
are more likely to depart from strict shareholder value maximization by

E.g., Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, The Proper Role of a
Target’s Management in Responding to a Tender Offer, 94 Harv. L. Rev. 1161 (1981);
Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Takeover Bids, Defensive Tactics, and
Shareholders’ Welfare, 36 Bus. Law. 1733 (1981).
12
Id.
13
Id.
11

8
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splurging on workers or the environment. But is that always the case?
We do not wish to throw stones at particular companies. Let’s just say
that it is not difficult to come up with lists of companies that have
provided big returns to stockholders while being known for
environmental irresponsibility, great consumer harm, unsafe working
conditions and poor diversity, equity, and inclusion (“DEI”) practices, and
low pay to the workers and the regular employment of contracted workers
with no rights and trifling wages.
Finally, they posit an identity between increasing shareholder
profits and generating overall economic growth. They suggest that this
identity has eluded commentators:
Firms that close plants in one area while
relocating production elsewhere are accused of
lacking a sense of responsibility to affected
workers and communities. Yet such a statement
ignores the greater benefits that workers and
communities in the new locale enjoy. (They must
be greater, or there would be no profit in the move.)
. . . All competition produces dislocation—all
progress produces dislocation (pity the makers of
vacuum tubes and slide rules!)—and to try to stop
the wrenching shifts of a capitalist economy is to
try to stop economic growth. 14
This final justification gets at the core of the win-win prediction: a
change that increases shareholder profits necessarily represents social
progress. If a firm’s shareholders profit from a move, it must be the case
that other constituencies benefit as well. But this suggestion ignores the
possibility of maneuvers that increase shareholder profits by squeezing
other constituencies more effectively: win-lose changes that are negative
on net. Put simply, these moves can contribute to an overall shift, where

14

Id. at 38-39.
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the have’s — the owners of equity — win at the overall expense of the
many, the workers most responsible for our economy’s success, by
creating a cycle of extraction at their expense to squeeze out more and
more gains for the stockholders. In other words, although it may well be
that a corporation can often move to a place where workers or the
community are so worse off that the corporation can cut its cost of
operations while somewhat improving the lives of the lower-waged and
less-protected workers they have engaged to replace those with better
quality wages and rights, that way of “increasing efficiency” is one that
does not lift all workers and stakeholders in the long run, but one that
encourages a downward spiral in which all workers and stakeholders lose
leverage to their ultimate expense. And, as a matter of reality,
stockholders have taken more of the gains of corporate wealth created by
American workers as a result of the power shift to investors that
Easterbrook and Fischel advocated in The Economic Structure of
Corporate Law.
II.

Flawed Predictions

In this Part, we evaluate whether Easterbrook and Fischel’s
predictions have held true. We find that they have not. Corporations
have created financial returns for shareholders, but largely at the
expense of other constituencies like workers. The imbalances in our
current system have also left it brittle and less capable of avoiding or
responding to crises.
Many studies have documented corporate America’s failure to
generate shared prosperity, and any survey of results will necessarily be
incomplete. But some recent results have been particularly shocking.
In one study, Professors Daniel L. Greenwald, Martin Lettau, and
Syndey C. Ludvigson explore the reasons for increases in American
market equity values.15 They estimate that between 1952 and 1988,
Daniel L. Greenwald, Martin Lettau & Sydney C. Ludvigson, How the
Wealth Was Won: Factors Shares as Market Fundamentals, NBER Working Paper
15
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economic growth accounted for the full increase in American equity. But
from 1989 to 2017, 44% of the increase was driven by a reallocation of
rewards from stakeholders—principally labor—to shareholders, 18% by
a lower risk price, and 14% by lower interest rates. Only 25% percent of
the increase was caused by genuine economic growth.
In another study, Professors Anna Stansbury and Larry H.
Summers examine the increase in corporate value and the decrease in
the share of national income going to labor and conclude that it is a direct
result of a decline in worker power:
The evidence in this paper suggests that the
American economy has become more ruthless, as
declining unionization, increasingly demanding
and empowered shareholders, decreasing real
minimum wages, reduced worker protections, and
the increases in outsourcing domestically and
abroad have disempowered workers—with
profound consequences for the labor market and
the broader economy. We argue that the reduction
in workers’ ability to lay claim to rents within
firms could explain the entirety of the change in
the distribution of income between labor and
capital in the United States in recent decades and
could also explain the rise in corporate valuations,
profitability, and measured markups, as well as
some of the decline in the [non-accelerating
inflation rate of unemployment].16

No.
25769
(rev.
Apr.
2021),
https://www.nber.org/system/files/working_papers/w25769/w25769.pdf
16
Anna Stansbury & Lawrence H. Summers, The Declining Worker Power
Hypothesis: An Explanation for the Recent Evolution of the American Economy,
Brookings Papers on Economic Activity 63 (Spring 2020).
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Stansbury and Summers also note that the same phenomenon may have
contributed to inequality: “the declines in unionization and the real value
of the minimum wage and the fissuring of the workplace affected middleand low-income workers more than high-income workers, and some of the
lost labor rents for the majority of workers may have been redistributed
to high-earning executives (as well as capital owners).” 17
Importantly, Stansbury and Summers isolate this profound shift in
gainsharing away from American workers and toward stockholders from
the overall effect of globalization. As they point out, American workers’
productivity and resulting corporate profits have grown substantially as
the economy has globalized. 18 But, what has most changed is that the
share of the profits that corporations generate that goes to workers has
diminished substantially, with their former share instead going to
stockholders. 19
Surveying the landscape and collecting a broad range of sources,
one of us has commented:
[T]he world is not an optimistic place. Median
income has stagnated since the early 1970s.
Productivity increases have slowed and wages
never did fully experience the benefit of rapid
productivity increases of the last two decades.
Economic growth is stagnant. The government
has been compelled to provide giant subsidies to

17
18
19

Id. at 8.
Id. at 2-3.
Id. at 3-4. Stansbury and Summers’ work underscores and is consistent

with the outstanding work of, among others, Lawrence Mishel of the Economic Policy
Institute on this point. E.g., Lawrence Mishel, Growing inequalities, reflecting
growing employer power, have generated a productivity-pay gap since 1979,
Economic Policy Institute (Sep. 2, 2021), https://www.epi.org/blog/growinginequalities-reflecting-growing-employer-power-have-generated-a-productivity-paygap-since-1979-productivity-has-grown-3-5-times-as-much-as-pay-for-the-typicalworker/.

12
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corporations engaged in risky commercial conduct.
At the same time, the number of American public
corporations has declined sharply. Finally, there
is a growing disparity between the pay of CEOs
and that of average workers, symptomatic of a
general increase in inequality.20
And that was before the societal and economic crisis prompted by
COVID-19. The crisis exposed serious gaps in the preparations of socially
important companies. In a broad range of industries, from healthcare to
meat processing, companies had relentlessly optimized themselves to
maximize immediate shareholder profits within a particular operating
environment. As a result, these essential businesses were unable to
operate safely at socially required levels when the crisis struck.21 Having
failed to husband adequate reserves in the face of stockholder demands
to run “lean balance sheets,” many corporations reacted to the pandemic
by mass layoffs and by shirking their rent obligations. 22 And it turned
out that the workers essential to making our economy work turned out
Strine, Who Bleeds When Wolves Bite?, supra note __ at 1950-51.
See Aneil Kovvali, Essential Businesses and Shareholder Value, 2021
U. Chi. Legal F. 191, https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3993775.
22
E.g., Douglas MacMillan, et al., America’s biggest companies are
flourishing during the pandemic and putting thousands of people out of work, Wash.
Post (Dec. 16, 2020), www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/2020/business/50-biggestcompanies-coronavirus-layoffs/ (“45 of the 50 most valuable publicly traded U.S.
companies turned a profit . . . . Despite their success, at least 27 of the 50 largest
firms held layoffs this year, collectively cutting more than 100,000 workers); Taylor
Borden, et al., The coronavirus outbreak has triggered unprecedented mass layoffs
20
21

and furloughs. Here are the major companies that have announced they are
downsizing
their
workforces,
Business
Insider
(Oct.
8,
2020),

https://www.businessinsider.com/coronavirus-layoffs-furloughs-hospitality-servicetravel-unemployment-2020; Conor Dougherty & Peter Eavis, Tenants’ Troubles Put
Stress on Commercial Real Estate, N.Y. Times (June 9, 2020),
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/06/05/business/economy/coronavirus-commercialreal-estate.html; Leo E. Strine, Jr. & Dorothy S. Lund, How to restore strength and
fairness to our economy, N.Y. Times (Apr. 10, 2020) (“many businesses did not have
sufficient reserves to pay the next month’s rent after less than a month of slowdown,
and . . . many more furloughed or laid off thousands of workers for the same reason”).
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to be paid less than most workers and less likely to be white. 23 These
essential workers had to put themselves more at risk for less pay.
Human beings were more exposed to a deadly pandemic so that they
could continue to work in unsafe conditions at these companies: our
system designated some jobs so essential that the lives of the workers
who filled them could be sacrificed. Millions of workers also lost their
jobs, suffered reduced wages, and had their housing endangered or lost.
Yet as the crisis unfolded and deaths climbed into the hundreds of
thousands, share prices reached record highs.
This disparity is not one we point out to blame corporate America
for the pandemic; we do not blame it for this disaster for humanity. But
the fact that the investor class has seen its returns soar at a time when
other corporate stakeholders were struggling to survive highlights again
the unreality of the win-win hypothesis of managing corporations to the
market.
III.

Flawed Assumptions

In this Part, we evaluate whether Easterbrook and Fischel’s
assumptions have held true. We find that they have not. They assumed
a dynamic where corporate stockholders were weak and dispersed, strong

E.g., Tiffany N. Ford & Molly Kinder, Black essential workers’ lives
matter. They deserve real change, not just lip service., Brookings (June 24, 2020),
23

https://www.brookings.edu/research/black-essential-workers-lives-matter-theydeserve-real-change-not-just-lip-service/ (“From bus drivers to security guards to
hospital orderlies, Black workers are overrepresented among COVID-19’s frontline
essential workers (defined as essential workers who must physically report to jobs
sites where they face elevated risks of infection). They are especially overrepresented
in jobs that put workers’ and their families lives at risk without even a familysustaining living wage.”); Elise Gould & Valerie Wilson, Black workers face two of
the most lethal preexisting conditions for coronavirus, Economic Policy Institute
(June 1, 2020), https://www.epi.org/publication/black-workers-covid/ (summarizing
finding that (summarizing finding that Black workers “make up a disproportionate
share of . . . essential workers who are forced to put themselves and their family
members at additional risk of contracting and spreading COVID-19 in order to put
food on the table”).

14
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external institutions protected other stakeholders, and there was more
slack for management to act in other regarding ways. These assumptions
have not held: a) stockholders are reaggregated and powerful, reducing
the space management has to balance fairly the interests of workers,
creditors, consumers, communities, and others against the desire of
concentrated short-term stockholders for greater returns; b) external
protection of other stakeholders has been compromised, in large measure
by corporate influence itself; c) workers in particular have suffered a loss
of protection; and d) financial markets have failed to deliver returns
correlated to social value created by firms, in part because the
government has regularly stepped in to bail out the shareholders of firms
that ran socially-destructive risks.
In some ways, our approach is anticipated by the work of Adolf
Berle. Berle recognized that corporations must be disciplined by
government, by product markets, and by shareholders, and was attentive
to the implications of shifts in the real world effectiveness of and among
those institutions. 24
A.

Rising Stockholder Power

Easterbrook and Fischel’s writings treat shareholders as a
dispersed and powerless group, unable to overcome collective action
Although this
problems to assert their shared interests. 25
characterization might have had some purchase at the time they wrote,
it is entirely inaccurate today.
As a result of the decline in defined benefit pension plans, tax
incentives and changes in investment fashions, American savers have
increasingly had to place their wealth in the hands of institutional

William W. Bratton & Michael L. Wachter, Shareholder Primacy’s
Corporatist Origins: Adolf Berle and the Modern Corporation, 34 J. Corp. L. 99
(2008).
25
See infra note __ and accompanying text.
24
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investors. 26 Institutional investors deploy the capital saved in tax
advantaged retirement and educational accounts, like 401(k)s and 529
accounts. Such institutional investors often have incentives that
systematically differ from the relatively broad and diverse base of human
workers and savers whose capital is being deployed, and thus are eager
to churn portfolios and to demand rapid short term financial returns of
portfolio companies.27 Institutional investors implementing passive
index-tracking strategies have also grown to enormous size: the “Giant
Three” index funds cast approximately 25% of the votes in corporate
elections. 28 Such index funds have strong incentives to defer to proxy
advisory services and “governance arbitrageurs” who also insist upon
rapid short term financial returns. 29 As a result of these trends,
shareholder power is increasingly concentrated in the hands of a few
players that often have a unified agenda. These institutions have pushed
corporate governance policies that make corporations more subject to
direct stockholder sentiment, more open to market for corporate control,
and more focused on total stock return. 30

See Leo E. Strine, Jr., Toward Common Sense and Common Ground?
Reflections on the Shared Interests of Managers and Labor in a More Rational
System of Corporate Governance, 33 J. Corp. L. 1, 4-5 (2007) (workers are forced
26

capitalists in the sense that they must turn over a substantial fraction of their
earnings to mutual funds participating in 401(k) and 529 accounts if they wish to
save for college for their children and retirement for themselves).
27
Strine, Who Bleeds When Wolves Bite?, supra note __ at 1928.
28
E.g., Lucian A. Bebchuk & Scott Hirst, The Specter of the Giant Three,
99 B.U. L. Rev. 721 (2019).
29
Ronald J. Gilson & Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Agency Costs of Agency
Capitalism: Activist Investors and the Revaluation of Governance Rights, 113 Colum.
L. Rev. 863 (2013).
30
E.g., Dorothy S. Lund & Elizabeth Pollman, The Corporate Governance
Machine, 121 Colum. L. Rev. --- (forthcoming 2022) (describing multiple institutional
gatekeepers that enforce fidelity to a particular model of shareholder primacy);
Strine, Why Bleeds When Wolves Bite?, supra note __ at 1916 (describing fund
manager acquiescence in efforts to install “a direct democracy, corporate California
model – where there is always an opportunity for immediate market sentiments to be
heard and where there is no attempt to establish a rational system of periodic votes
on issues like executive compensation”); William Savitt & Aneil Kovvali, On the
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And, even though more Americans are required to invest, the share
of stock owned by the affluent remains extremely high, and many less
affluent members of our society do not own any stock at all. Therefore,
shifts in gainsharing from corporate workers to stockholders exacerbates
inequality and prevents workers from building wealth themselves. 31
Likewise, pressures by stockholders on corporations encourage
corporations to engage in rent-seeking against taxpayers, by seeking
exemptions from critical sources of revenues for schools, local
institutions, and the federal government. The share of taxes paid by
corporations has drastically diminished, a reality that undercuts the
ability to fund important regulatory agencies essential to stakeholder
protection and that shifts the obligation to government more away from
the wealthy and toward the average person.32

Promise of Stakeholder Governance: A Response to Bebchuk and Tallarita, 106

Cornell L. Rev. 101, 102 & n.2 (forthcoming 2021). These institutions have scored
real victories in advancing their vision of optimal corporate governance, including
dismantling classified boards. It is at best unclear whether these victories have
actually created shareholder value. E.g., Yakov Amihud, Markus Schmid & Steven
Davidoff Solomon, Settling the Staggered Board Debate, 166 U. Penn. L. Rev. 1475
(2018) (concluding that classified boards create value at some firms, destroy value at
some firms, and have no effect at others).
31
Strine, Who Bleeds When Wolves Bite?, supra note __ at 1941-42. For
recent statistics, see Lydia Saad & Jeffrey M. Jones, What Percentage of Americans
Owns
Stock?,
Gallup
(Aug.
13,
2021),
https://news.gallup.com/poll/266807/percentage-americans-owns-stock.aspx (stating
that only 56% of Americans report owning any stock, and that only 24% of Americans
with less than $40,000 in income report owning stock). Because this economic
inequality translates into unequal power in society, it also serves to exacerbate racial
inequality. See Lenore Palladino, The Contribution of Shareholder Primacy to the
Racial Wealth Gap, Roosevelt Institute Working Paper (Mar. 6, 2020),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3526258; Leo E. Strine, Jr.,

Toward Racial Equality: The Most Important Things The Business Community Can
Do,
The
CLS
Blue
Sky
Blog
(Nov.
2,
2020),

https://clsbluesky.law.columbia.edu/2020/11/02/toward-racial-equality-the-mostimportant-things-the-business-community-can-do/.
32
See Thomas L. Hungerford, Corporate tax rates and economic growth
since
1947,
Economic
Policy
Institute
(June
4,
2013),
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These developments undermine Easterbrook and Fischel’s case for
strengthening shareholders. Individual shareholders can freely exit
their positions and can recapture their capital investment with ease.
Because shareholder power is not dispersed or subject to collective action
problems, shareholders as a group can also readily force corporations to
return capital through dividends and share buybacks. Far from being
locked-in and powerless, forced to accept the “residual” remaining after
other constituencies have claimed their fair share, stockholders are able
to claim early and often, and to force costs and risks onto other
constituencies.
This can ultimately damage shareholders themselves. A timely
example of the fact that managing companies to benefit solely their
stockholders ultimately damages investors is human-created climate
change. The sad reality is that the very industry that generated the most
climate — the oil and gas industry — knew and accepted the reality that
human carbon emissions were causing climate change that was
ultimately unsustainable.33

https://www.epi.org/publication/ib364-corporate-tax-rates-and-economic-growth/
(corporate income taxes accounted for about 30% of total revenues in the 1950s, but
only 10% in 2012). Easterbrook and Fischel also ignore the reality that taxing
corporations, which are owned on average by wealthier people, has a progressive
effect as opposed to imposing taxes at the individual level. Blair, supra note __ (“[T]he
corporate income tax contributes to the overall progressivity of the tax system to the
extent that the corporate tax burden falls on capital. . . . Many policy analysts and
government agencies distribute the majority of corporate tax burden to capital
(between 75 percent and 82 percent).”).
33
E.g., Geoffrey Supran & Naomi Oreskes, Assessing ExxonMobil’s
climate change communications (1977-2014), 2017 Environ. Research Letters 12
(2017) (presenting study of ExxonMobil documents and public communications, and
concluding “that ExxonMobil misled the public”); Shannon Hall, Exxon Knew about
Climate Change almost 40 years ago, Scientific American (Oct. 26, 2015),
https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/exxon-knew-about-climate-changealmost-40-years-ago/.
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Like the tobacco industry before it, 34 this industry responded to this
knowledge by suppressing it from the public, and when others presented
the evidence, disputing that evidence, while knowing it was correct. This
behavior might well have benefited an undiversified stockholder of these
particular corporations in the short term. This is by no means certain.
Even concentrated shareholders can suffer as managers adopt measures
to drive up immediate financial returns and seek to bend the regulatory
system instead of attending to the risks that the system is intended to
address. 35
But the most substantial costs are borne by human beings in their
full economic and human portfolios (think, for example, their need for
quality jobs, a healthy environment, and their obligation to pay taxes to
cover externalize corporate harms) and thus society as a whole, and are
reflected in diminished returns for diversified investors with broad
See, e.g., United States v. Philip Morris USA, Inc., 449 F.Supp.2d 1, 28
(D.D.C. 2006), vacated in part and affirmed in part, 566 F.3d 1095 (D.C. Cir. 2009)
(The tobacco industry “survives, and profits, from selling a highly addictive product
which causes diseases that lead to a staggering number of deaths per year, an
immeasurable amount of human suffering and economic loss, and a profound burden
on our national health care system. Defendants have known many of these facts for
at least 50 years or more. Despite that knowledge, they have consistently, repeatedly,
and with enormous skill and sophistication, denied these facts to the public, to the
Government, and to the public health community.”).
35
See, e.g., Leo E. Strine, Jr., Fiduciary Blind Spot: The Failure of
34

Institutional Investors to Prevent the Illegitimate Use of Working Americans’
Savings for Corporate Political Spending, 97 Wash. U. L. Rev. 1007, 1036-37 (2020)

(“Logically, one would infer that there is a high correlation between public
corporations that engage in problematic behavior and those that engage in spending
to influence the political process. Even from the narrow perspective of an investor in
an actively traded mutual fund with a smaller portfolio of stocks, there is strong
reason to be concerned that corporate political spending is a warning signal for
investors.”); John C. Coates, IV., Corporate Politics, Governance, and Value Before
and After Citizens United, 9 J. Empirical Stud. 657, 658 (2012) (corporate “political
activity . . . correlates negatively with . . . shareholder value”). For one deadly
example of a corporation pursuing immediate shareholder profits, working the
regulators, and facing a catastrophe as a result, see Peter Robison, Flying Blind: The
737 MAX Tragedy and the Fall of Boeing (2021) (discussing Boeing’s development of
the 737 Max, a defective plane that caused numerous deadly high-profile crashes).
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portfolios. Given the huge costs that climate change has already
imposed, and the gigantic costs it will pose in the near future, it is not
credible to claim that this corporate behavior represented a win-win
between these companies’ investors and society.
In fact, for diversified investors, the gains made by these companies
by delaying a transformation of their industries will be swamped by the
negative costs to all companies and society. 36 The same can be said of the
misuse by pharmaceutical companies of their marketing techniques to
pump up sales of opioids, in an irresponsible, life- and communitydestroying way. 37
And this raises another flaw in Easterbrook and Fischel’s
reasoning. Most investors are not long one company or one industry.
They are long the whole economy.
Most of them depend more on their job for their wealth than their
stock. Most of their portfolios track the whole economy, and also contain
substantial amounts of debt securities.38 And these diversified human
investors also pay taxes, consume products, and live in the environment.

E.g. John C. Coffee, Jr., The Future of Disclosure: ESG, Common
Ownership, and Systematic Risk, 2021 Colum. Bus. L. Rev. 602; Madison Condon,
Externalities and the Common Owner, 95 Wash. L. Rev. 1 (2020). Concentrated
36

shareholders can also suffer as a result of measures adopted to drive up immediate
financial returns.
37
For an account of the pharmaceutical industry’s marketing of opioids,
its effect on society, and its effect on the financial fortunes of one group of
concentrated shareholders, see Patrick Radden Keefe, Empire of Pain: The Secret
History of the Sackler Dynasty (2021). Although the infamous Purdue Pharma was
a privately held company, public companies also participated in the mass marketing
of these dangerously addictive drugs. See, e.g., Jan Hoffman, Drug Distributors and
J&J Reach $26 Billion Deal to End Opioid Lawsuits, N.Y. Times (July 21, 2021),
https://www.nytimes.com/2021/07/21/health/opioids-distributors-settlement.html
(describing $26 billion settlement with Johnson & Johnson, Cardinal Health,
AmerisourceBergen, and McKesson for opioid misconduct).
38
Like many others, Easterbrook and Fischel overestimate the extent to
which agency costs only exist in a form that harms stockholders. Most diversified
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A system of corporate governance that focuses each company on
maximizing the immediate wealth of the company’s specific stockholders
does not even maximize the overall economic welfare of equity investors.
Rather, by pushing companies to manage to the market and only consider
their equity investors, it moves all corporate managers more to the edge
of irresponsibility, in which short-cuts that harm workers, creditors,
consumers, communities, and the environment are tempting ways to
satisfy their powerful stockholders’ demands. Instead of recognizing the
reality that American corporate law has always given priority to
stockholders, Easterbrook and Fischel instead push for it to limit the
space managers have to create wealth in ways that are respectful of other
stakeholders and thus create far greater incentives to harm stakeholders
and society, and diversified investors themselves.
To the extent that the vision of shareholders as true residual
claimants was true in the middle of the 20th century, one wonders what
made it so. What made it impossible for businesses to succeed unless
they treated labor with respect and did not externalize other costs to
society? It was certainly not some natural force of economics. Economic
history suggests that it is quite possible for equity owners to profit off the

investors hold corporate debt securities as a substantial part of their portfolio, but
the level of stewardship they receive by the institutional investors who run debt funds
is far less than exists on the equity side, and underwriting standards have eroded as
debt has been securitized. Just as is the case with workers, stockholders can and do
gain at the expense of creditors. A good deal of evidence exists that increases in stock
prices as a result of activism often result in value transfers from debt holders to equity
holders. E.g., Strine, Who Bleeds When Wolves Bite?, supra note __ at 1940 (noting
that “some scholars have found that rather than creating additional firm value, hedge
fund activism engaged in by equity investors has the effect of shifting wealth from
debt capital to equity capital” and collecting sources); John C. Coffee, Jr. & Darius
Palia, The Wolf at the Door: The Impact of Hedge Fund Activism on Corporate
Governance, 41 J. Corp. L. 545 (2016) (citing evidence that in activist engagements
“there is a wealth transferred [sic] from bondholders to shareholders”). Cf. John C.
Coffee, Jr., Shareholders Versus Managers: The Strain in the Corporate Web, 85
Mich. L. Rev. 1, 68 (1986) (“Anecdotal evidence is now abundant that bondholders
have recently been adversely affected by highly leveraged takeovers.”).
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back of others. 39 Instead, it was an appropriate regulatory environment.
Most of what the New Deal and European Social Democratic reforms
were about was a recognition of that reality, and creating a structure
within which businesses were more likely to make money in a way that
required that they have at least some minimal regard for workers,
consumers, the environment, and society as a whole. But, as discussed
below, Easterbrook and Fischel are among the school of thinkers who say
stakeholders should rely on external legal protections outside of
corporate law, without favoring those protections and while generally
supporting their erosion or repeal. The Easterbrook and Fischel position
is a specific application of Milton Friedman, and all share the FriedmanReagan view that stakeholder protections should largely be dispensed
with and the Powell view that corporations should use their influence to
make that happen. Indeed, Friedman opposed the National Labor
Relations Act, minimum wage laws, and the Civil Rights Act of 1964, and

This is not a new phenomenon. As President Lincoln recognized,
economic exploitation was a major part of the moral abomination of slavery. See
Abraham Lincoln, Second Inaugural Address (Mar. 4, 1865) (“It may seem strange
that [the Confederacy] should dare ask a just God’s assistance in wringing their bread
from the sweat of other men’s faces, but let us judge not that we be not judged.”). This
fact was not lost on former slaves. Eric Foner, Reconstruction: America’s Unfinished
Revolution, 1863–1877 102 (rev. ed. 2014) (“Blacks brought out of slavery a
conception of themselves as a ‘Working Class of People’ who had been unjustly
deprived of the fruits of their labor.”). It was not lost on the architects of
Reconstruction, who sought to remake the southern economy on lines that would
promote economic freedom. Id. at 392. And it was not lost on the violent opponents
of Reconstruction, who sought to restore conditions of economic exploitation rapidly
upon assuming power. See id. at 588 (Southern Redeemers “shared . . . a commitment
to dismantling the Reconstruction state, reducing the political power of blacks, and
reshaping the South’s legal system in the interests of labor control and racial
subordination.”). Feudal systems persisted well into the Twentieth Century in
various forms. E.g., Nikolas Bowie, Antidemocracy, 135 Harv. L. Rev. 160, 160-61
(2021) (tracing through-line of antidemocratic oppression of workers from slavery
through the redemption period to twentieth century efforts to suppress agricultural
labor organizing). And so-called laissez-faire, when it evolved, often involved markets
that in reality provided no power to workers in comparison to those with inherited
wealth and who were part of the powerful classes. In all of these eras, and even today,
profit could be reaped by a few at the expense of the many.
39

22

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4007542

he considered racial equality concerns and environmental considerations
to be newly emerging “watch words of the current crop of reformers” that
businesses should ignore.40 In his world view, effective external
protections for workers, the environment, consumers and society actually
would not exist, and one senses that Easterbrook and Fischel are closer
to his position, and that of Ronald Reagan, than is stated in the work that
is the subject of this celebration. In sum, Easterbrook and Fischel cannot
be characterized as supporters of those external safeguards, and their
opposition to allowing corporations to be other-regarding toward
workers, other stakeholder, and society must be understood in the
context of a world view that generally prefers that the New Deal not have
occurred and the EPA not to exist.
B.

Declining External
Stakeholders

Protections

for

Other

Corporate

As even Easterbrook and Fischel acknowledge, government
regulation is required to force firms to internalize the costs of their
behavior:
We do not make the Panglossian claim that profit
and social welfare are perfectly aligned. When
costs fall on third parties—pollution is the
common example—firms do injury because harm
does not come back to them as private cost.
Dumping offal may impose costs on downstream
users exceeding the gains to the stockholders. . . .
The task is to establish property rights so that the
firm treats the social costs as private ones, and so
that its reactions, as managers try to maximize
profits given these new costs, duplicate what all of
the parties (downstream users and customers
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alike) would have agreed to were bargaining
among all possible without cost. 41
If the government fails to impose “new costs” on firms to force them to
internalize the consequences of their conduct, firms will engage in
socially destructive behavior.
The problem, of course, for this argument is that Easterbrook and
Fischel would not call themselves vigorous supporters of external
protections for stakeholders. 42 And more certainly, fellow adherents to
their world view, like Milton Friedman who opposed unions, the civil
rights and environmental laws, 43 are oddly positioned to say, “leave the
protection of other stakeholders to positive law,” when they oppose that
positive law, and advocated for policies, like those of the Reagan
Administration, to erode the effectiveness of key laws protecting workers,
consumers, minorities and women, and the environment.
Since 1980, many of the key protections for corporate stakeholders
have declined in strength, and that decline was encouraged by the
Reagan-Friedman school. The laws that protect workers’ right to
organize have been undercut, and so has the real value of the minimum
wage.44 Antitrust’s larger historical purpose was abandoned in favor of
a blinkered focus solely on short-term consumer welfare.45
Environmental agencies and laws were systematically attacked, and the

Easterbrook & Fischel, Economic Structure, supra note __ at 39.
Frank H. Easterbrook, When Does Competition Improve Regulation?,
52 Emory L.J. 1297, 1299 (2003) (“Regulation is a means by which a segment of the
populace enriches itself at the expense of the general welfare.”).
43
E.g., Milton Friedman, Capitalism and Freedom (1962).
44
E.g., David Cooper, Elise Gould & Ben Zipperer, Low-wage workers are
suffering from a decline in the real value of the federal minimum wage, Economic
Policy Institute (Aug. 27, 2019), https://www.epi.org/publication/labor-day-2019minimum-wage/ (“The real value of the federal minimum wage has dropped . . . 31%
since 1968.”).
45
E.g., Sanjukta Paul, Recovering the Moral Economy Foundations of the
Sherman Act, 131 Yale L.J. 175 (2021).
41
42
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same has been true of consumer protection laws. 46 And, governmental
attempts to remediate four hundred years of racial oppression of black
people and to protect women and other minorities have been hampered
by hostility from this same school.47 Indeed, when in power, ReaganFriedman adhering administrations have often governed agencies
charged with protecting stakeholders in a manner contrary to the obvious
statutory purpose for their existence. 48
Supporting these moves to undermine the external protections for
stakeholders, has been corporate political and lobbying expenditures,
which have gone predominantly to one political party, and in terms of
issues spending, have swamped our political system with funds for
candidates and causes opposing worker rights, environmental protection
(including addressing climate change), voting rights for minorities, and
regulation to protect consumers. 49 The result is a vicious cycle in which

E.g., David M. Uhlmann, Back to the Future: Creating a Bipartisan
Environmental Movement for the 21st Century, 50 Envtl. L. Rep. 100800, 10802
46

(2020).

47

See Adam Winkler, We the Corporations: How American Businesses

Won Their Civil Rights 278 (2018) (noting Lewis Powell’s role in subjecting racial
affirmative action programs to strict scrutiny and his overall successful effort in
encouraging business to go to war on the New Deal/Great Society regulatory state).
48
See Uhlmann, supra note __ (describing Reagan’s appointment of
Gorsuch to the EPA and Watt to the Department of the Interior). More recent
examples include President Trump’s appointment of Eugene Scalia to the
Department of Labor.
49
E.g., Center for Political Accountability, Conflicted Consequences (2021)
(showing that corporations have used opaque 527 organizations as vehicles to channel
money to political causes that conflict with their stated values, with the bulk of
spending going to benefit the Republican Party); Eric Lipton, Mike McIntire & Don
Van Natta, Jr., Top Corporations Aid U.S. Chamber of Commerce Campaign, N.Y.
Times
(Oct.
21,
2010),
https://www.nytimes.com/2010/10/22/us/politics/22chamber.html
(describing
corporate support for the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, and the Chamber’s support for
Republican causes); Chris Frates, Koch Bros.-backed group gave millions to small
business lobby, CNN (Nov. 21, 2013), https://www.cnn.com/2013/11/21/politics/smallbusiness-big-donor/index.html (describing corporate support for the National
Federation of Independent Business).
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corporations gain wealth and economic power, translate that wealth and
economic power into political power for themselves and the wealthier
segment of society, and use that political power to gain further wealth
and economic power.
The government has thus not been effective in compensating for the
enormous growth in stockholder power, and for predictable reasons.
Constituencies other than shareholders often struggle to make their
voices heard in the political process due to resource constraints, collective
action problems, and unrepresentative structures in our government.50
By contrast, corporations have perfected the art of exerting political
influence. Put simply, capital is capital, and in a money dominated
regulatory environment, the have’s tend to win out.
The Easterbrook response to this power imbalance in the legislative
process is to deny that it exists. Easterbrook has claimed that
corporations face serious collective action problems that make it difficult
for them to protect themselves through the political process.51 This is
implausible on its face: corporations and institutional investors have
formed interest groups and sophisticated lobbying operations. And
corporations have a shared interest in enfeebling labor and other social
interests.

Cf. Kate Andrias & Benjamin I. Sachs, Constructing Countervailing
Power: Law and Organizing in an Era of Political Inequality, 130 Yale L.J. 546 (2021).
51
Frank H. Easterbrook, The Race for the Bottom in Corporate
Governance, 95 Va. L. Rev. 685, 700-01 (2009) (“And since ‘everyone knows’ that big
50

corporations are effective lobbyists, this should protect investors fully.
Unfortunately, what ‘everyone knows’ about the power of corporate lobbying is
wrong.”); Frank H. Easterbrook, When Does Competition Improve Regulation?, 52
Emory L.J. 1297, 1300 (2003) (“Corporations do not vote and are forbidden by law
from making political contributions.”). Others have picked up this torch, though
generally in less extreme ways. Cf. Jill E. Fisch, Measuring Efficiency in Corporate
Law: The Role of Shareholder Primacy, 31 J. Corp. L. 637, 665-66 (2006) (managers
more effective).
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Ultimately, the dispute can only be resolved by looking to evidence
and experience. Consider Easterbrook’s chosen evidence:
If you doubt this perspective on corporate
influence, ask yourself: why is there a corporate
income tax?
Not because corporations are
wealthy; corporations are just place-holders,
collective names for aggregates of investments.
The corporate tax is attractive to politicians
because it is invisible. No natural person pays the
bill. Investors are so scattered and diversified that
they cannot resist it, cannot even tell who pays it.
. . . Corporations do not hold political power in
America: they are too large, and their investors too
many.52
To which we might respond, ask yourself: is there an effective
corporate income tax? Not for the many major corporations, including
Nike and FedEx, that reportedly paid no taxes for 2020. 53 And not until
recently for one of America’s largest corporations, Amazon, which seems
to have avoided paying federal income taxes as recently as 2018. 54 A
recent tax cut bill gave most of its benefits — in a period of huge and
growing inequality — to corporations and the wealthy, on the supposed
promise that the cuts would result in job-creating and improving
investments in the U.S. The cuts came to pass; the investments not so

Easterbrook, Race for the Bottom, supra note __ at 701-02.
E.g., Chris Isidore, Jeff Bezos endorsed higher corporate tax rates. But
it
won’t
cost
him
much,
CNN
Business
(Apr.
10,
2021),
https://www.cnn.com/2021/04/10/business/jeff-bezos-amazon-corporatetaxes/index.html.
54
E.g., Richard Rubin, Does Amazon Really Pay No Taxes? Here’s the
Complicated Answer, Wall St. J. (June 14, 2019), https://www.wsj.com/articles/doesamazon-really-pay-no-taxes-heres-the-complicated-answer-11560504602.
52
53
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much. 55 And the share of taxes paid by corporations in the United States
is a third of what it was in prior generations. 56
These problems are not limited to the political branches. Like
Lewis F. Powell, Jr., himself, the architect of corporate America’s
successful strategy for winning the war of ideas who ultimately ascended
to the Supreme Court,57 the problems made the leap to the judiciary.
Conservative judicial decisions have exacerbated defects in the political
process by systematically strengthening the political power of
corporations while systematically weakening the political power of
organized labor and racial minorities. 58 These decisions have frequently
involved the invalidation of legislation approved overwhelmingly by
Congress, and the use of Lochner-era reasoning that is selectively
applied.59

See Hunter Blair, As investment continues to decline, the Trump tax
cuts remain nothing but a handout to the rich, Economic Policy Institute (Feb. 4,
55

2020), https://www.epi.org/blog/as-investment-continues-to-decline-the-trump-taxcuts-remain-nothing-but-a-handout-to-the-rich/ (“investment has cratered” in the
months after the Trump tax cuts).
56
See Hungerford, supra note __.
57
Winkler, supra note __ at 278-89 (describing memorandum by Lewis
Powell urging businesses to cultivate and use political power to counter labor unions,
civil rights groups, and public interest law firms).
58
Compare the incompatible logic of Citizens United v. FEC, which
insisted that corporations must be allowed to play at politics despite concerns that
some shareholders might disapprove of the message, and Janus v. AFSCME, which
hobbled union participation in politics over concerns about dissenting workers. See
Jonathan Macey & Leo E. Strine, Jr., Citizens United As Bad Corporate Law, 2019
Wis. L. Rev. 451, 506-14.
59
In the ACA decision, Chief Justice Roberts held two Justices hostage to
get his vote on an obvious question of law — which is whether Congress had the
authority to enact the individual mandate within the ACA if it did not call that
mandate a tax — in exchange for invalidating an expansion of Medicaid to cover
everyone within 133% of the federal poverty line. When Congress adopted Medicaid,
it reserved the right to expand coverage, and the federal government was covering
most of the costs of expansion. But, according to Chief Justice Roberts, the states
objecting to this expansion had a sovereign right to continue to participate in
Medicaid — because they found it so valuable and useful — and to not have that
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Even if Easterbrook and Fischel earnestly supported stakeholderprotective legislation, it is unlikely that the political system could meet
that need. Given the onslaught of corporate lobbying and political
donations, it has become increasingly difficult for stakeholder-protective
legislation to pass in the first place. But, even when regulatory statutes
somehow survive this gantlet, they are then undermined, invalidated, or
misinterpreted by an activist, right wing judiciary with an arid approach
to statutes and a desire to repeal the New Deal and return to Lochner.
As a result, rules adopted to protect stakeholders are generally
interpreted and applied in a stingy and grudging manner. By contrast,
the fundamental rules that protect shareholders are interpreted and
applied by Delaware jurists who take a practical and equitable approach.
C.

The Particular Case Of Declining Protections For Workers
and The Fairness of Labor Markets

From a societal standpoint, the most important stakeholder is the
worker: corporate workers must be treated respectfully, have safe
working conditions, and quality wages. Workers are the many who make
a capitalist system work. Unless the wealth they create is fairly shared
with them, then there will be social instability and less overall wealth in
the way that matters. 60
In recognition of this reality, and also of the dangers that nativist
ideologues would use growing inequality and insecurity to appeal to
struggling workers, the New Deal sought to create a framework within

participation conditioned on paying their fair share of the expansion. In other words,
the states were like perpetual children who could not be expected to give up the
subsidies they received if they did not wish to contribute to the household’s needs.
This remarkable ruling is often lost sight of due to the tax ruling, but it resulted in
serious harm to consumers of health care and to the nation’s ability to effectively
address the pandemic, and to protect the health of struggling American families and
their children.
60
More wealth in the hands of billionaires may benefit them, but it has
little to do with overall prosperity, at least in a positive way that is associated with
communal well-being.
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which businesses would compete, while ensuring that they did not do so
unfairly at the expense of workers. Just as the Great Depression taught
policymakers that stock markets required vigorous regulation to avoid
abuses,61 the experience of history taught policymakers that labor
markets required vigorous regulation to generate reasonable outcomes.
Breaking sharply with the laissez faire model of capitalism that had
dominated the 19th and early 20th centuries, Congress enacted
minimum wage and collective bargaining provisions in the National
Industrial Recovery Act of 1933,62 created a framework for labor
organizing in the National Labor Relations Act of 1935, 63 and banned
child labor and set minimum wage and overtime pay requirements in the
Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938.64 Relatedly, Congress set up a
program — Social Security — to provide minimum economic support for
retired workers, and to provide economic support to the disabled.
The New Deal revolution was not complete, and its failure to
safeguard the rights of Black Americans, command full respect from
Southern states, or address the effect of trade with nations that had not
adopted similar regulations would ultimately limit its effectiveness.65
But there was a remarkably broad and durable consensus on the idea
that the government had a responsibility to protect workers. By setting
boundaries on markets, these regulations facilitated better dynamics
within markets: workers were empowered to bargain collectively for
61
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(describing minimum wage and collective bargaining provisions of the National
Industrial Recovery Act before finding the act unconstitutional).
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Response to Cueller, Levi, and Weingast, 57 Harv. J. on Leg. 67 (2020).
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better wages and conditions, and companies had less reason to resist
concessions because there were few competitive advantages to be gained
by squeezing workers.
An intellectual and political counterrevolution radically altered the
direction of American policymaking. From Milton Friedman’s various
broadsides against government regulation 66 and ethical approaches to
business,67 to Lewis Powell’s memorandum, 68 there was a concerted
effort to weaken protections for workers. These efforts culminated in (but
did not begin with69) the Reagan revolution, which proceeded from the
premise that “government is the problem.” 70 The new tone was vividly
demonstrated by President Reagan’s busting of the Professional Air
Traffic Controllers Organization, 71 and by his gutting of OSHA
regulations.72 Much like Easterbrook and Fischel, the proponents of
these changes urged that these changes would be a win-win, as the
increased efficiency and output would ultimately benefit workers:
The new review standard ordered for a number of
Occupational Safety and Health Administration
regulations, with an eye to relaxing them, could
affect such rules as how much lead, asbestos,
cotton dust or benzene will be in the air workers
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breathe. “Some workers will be less protected,”
concedes James C. Miller III, regulatory affairs
administrator at the Office of Management and
Budget and director of the president’s task force on
regulatory relief. But he also argues that worker
health and protection overall will improve because
industry will be better able to allocate its resources
to health priorities. “I am absolutely sure of that,”
Miller says. 73

The Economic Structure of Corporate Law, and the articles on

which it is based, can only be understood as part of this transformation.
Their influential work advocated a decisive rejection of the model of labor
relations present elsewhere in the OECD, where workers have voice
within large corporations through works councils and board
representation, and government buttresses and facilitates their efforts
with effective regulations. 74

The government’s abdication of its responsibility to ensure
reasonable outcomes for workers has had predictable consequences: as
we have already discussed, workers have not received a fair share of
corporate wealth. 75 Indeed, corporations have succeeded in delivering
value to shareholders largely by perfecting their oppression of workers:
one study found that a whopping 44% of the equity wealth generated by
corporations from 1989 to 2017 came at the expense of other corporate
constituencies, primarily workers. 76 Actual economic growth — as
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Shares as Market Fundamentals, Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research (Apr. 2021). Cf.
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opposed to squeezing workers and financial market developments —
represented just 25%. 77 The Easterbrook and Fischel model — have
corporations focus exclusively on shareholder wealth, while the
government and workers tend to other interests — thus appears
profoundly broken in the labor space.
Easterbrook and Fischel’s other scholarship stands as an obstacle
to remedying this failure. Consider labor law. In one striking analysis,
Professor Fischel provides a forceful rejection of collective bargaining by
workers:
Most economists are hostile to unions because they
view them as attempts by workers to act in concert
for the purpose of charging monopoly prices for
their labor. Only the labor exemption to the
antitrust laws, it is widely believed, enables
workers to act collectively without violating the
antitrust laws. Under this standard monopoly
view, unions reduce the value of the firm. 78
Fischel acknowledges the possibility that unions create value by
facilitating monitoring and more efficient deals between labor and
capital. But he rejects the possibility on the ground that managers do
not like dealing with them:
One method of distinguishing between the union
as an attempted solution to the free-rider problem
and the union as a monopoly is to analyze the
behavior of firms. If unions were solely a rational
response to the free-rider problem, firms would
voluntarily deal with them. . . . Perhaps some
firms do deal with unions voluntarily . . . [b]ut
casual empiricism suggests that firms frequently
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Fischel, Labor Law and Corporate Law, supra note __ at 1071.
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oppose organization drives by unions. . . .
Attempted appropriation of monopoly rents
created by imperfections in the product market is
a likely alternative explanation. 79
It’s a classic unworldly law and economics analysis: clever,
provocative, and utterly disconnected from real history and the real world
in which we live.
To begin, unions might be understood as a collective effort on the
part of workers to dictate the price of labor. But by parity of reasoning,
a business firm can be understood as a similar collective effort on the part
of shareholders to dictate prices in labor and product markets. As
Professor Sunjukta Paul has emphasized, courts invented a “firm
exemption” to antitrust law to permit shareholders to engage in this type
of economic coordination within firms. 80 This exemption for capital is far
less justified as a matter of law or logic than the “exemption” that allows
working people to freely associate in an effort to better their lot.
Shareholders also benefit from coordination across firms.
Sometimes the coordination is explicit: for example, antitrust authorities
were briefly jolted from complacency by the revelation that legallysophisticated Silicon Valley firms like Apple and Google had reached nopoaching agreements that clearly violated the Sherman Act. 81
Sometimes the coordination is the result of a convergence in practices. A
broad set of firms use non-compete agreements to limit the ability of
employees to seek alternative jobs. Firms are thus spared the need to
compete for worker time.

Id. at 1072-73.
See Sunjukta Paul, The Case for Repealing the Firm Exemption to
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Labor Market Power, 132 Harv. L. Rev. 536, 544 (2018).
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Coordination across firms to suppress wages can also come about
through capital markets, particularly when important institutional
investors are in thrall to the Easterbrook and Fischel model of corporate
governance. By pushing corporate managers at all firms to be responsive
to the short term whims of shareholders, their one-size-fits-all approach
to corporate governance may suppress investment in real world projects,
leaving slack in the labor market and depressing wages. 82
There is a glimmer of a response to these points in Fischel’s
suggestion that:
[T]here is “a greater risk of monopolization in the
labor area since there are better substitutes for
capital than for labor. Because of the availability
of alternative sources of funds (including retained
earnings), it is inconceivable, for example, that an
indenture trustee could negotiate a monopoly
return for capital. Unions have a somewhat
greater ability to obtain monopoly wages,
particularly if they have the ability to prevent the
hiring of substitutes by force or intimidation. 83
This clearly is not a realistic analysis today, if it ever was. In part due to
systematic suppression of investment and hiring in favor of delivering
value to shareholders,84 the American economy has long been
characterized by slack: a large number of workers are unemployed or
underemployed, and are therefore available to replace or substitute for
any employee who dares to demand better wages or working conditions.

Zohar Goshen & Doron Levit, Common Ownership and the Decline of
the American Worker.
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Fischel, Labor Law and Corporate Law, supra note __ at 1072. In
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American workers have also found themselves under constant
threat of replacement by workers abroad and by workers at other firms.
Employers have learned to use fissuring and offshoring to break up
worker power, and drive gains for shareholders. Although shareholder
money can always flow someplace more congenial—whether within the
United States or abroad—workers often cannot move without substantial
sacrifices. 85 This fundamental imbalance of power suggests the need to
support workers in their battle with shareholders, but Easterbrook and
Fischel’s analysis has largely tended in the opposite direction. 86

Frank H. Easterbrook, The Race for the Bottom in Corporate
Governance, 95 Va. L. Rev. 685, 698 (2009) (“Capital is highly mobile, as are
governance structures, even when physical assets and labor are immobile.”); cf. Frank
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currency-futures contracts—no one country can impose costs on investors. Any
attempt to do so will cause firms and investors to transfer funds elsewhere.”). The
mobility of capital does not simply weaken workers directly. It also weakens
institutions that seek to defend them and other stakeholders. Governments struggle
to impose regulations or appropriate taxes because corporations can pursue
regulatory or tax arbitrage strategies to shift operations or accounting profits abroad.
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D.

Bailouts for the Have’s, Bupkis for the Many

The residual claimant theory rests on the notion that unless other
stakeholders receive their full returns, then stockholders cannot gain.
That notion, however, acts as if there was a, say, generational summing
up, and where stockholders who have held for 20 years can only get paid,
if there is a determination that workers’ pensions have been funded and
promised to them fully honored, that all corporate taxes have been paid
to communities of operation, that all creditors have been satisfied, and
that consumers and the environment have either not been harmed or
have received full compensation. But that is not how the world works.
Stockholders take — claim — all the time, and often in advance of
other stakeholders. The rules against distributions without adequate
capital are far too lax to protect stakeholders from this risk, and there is
no serious argument that stockholders are really residual claimants
except insofar as in occasional cases, those holding the remaining equity
in a bankruptcy are supposedly last in line. That does not mean that in
the run up to insolvency that was the case.87
In fact, bankruptcies have often resulted from transactions where
gains were extracted by stockholders at the expense of workers and
creditors, and a good company went insolvent, not because it could not
make profits, but it could not make profits to sufficient the leverage put
See Jared A. Ellias & Robert J. Stark, Bankruptcy Hardball, 108 Cal. L.
Rev. 745 (2020) (describing rise of tactics by managers of distressed firms to secure
value for shareholders at the expense of creditors). The bankruptcy process can also
undermine protections for other stakeholders, as bankruptcy judges eager to ensure
a successful corporate reorganization undermine laws and regulations intended to
protect stakeholders. E.g., Jonathan Randles, Judge Throws Out Purdue Pharma’s
Deal to Shield Sacklers From Opioid Lawsuits, Wall St. J. (Dec. 16, 2021) (describing
district judge’s ruling rejecting bankruptcy court order that would have shielded
Sackler family from liability for Purdue’s involvement in the opioid crisis); Joshua
Macey & Jackson Salovaara, Bankruptcy as Bailout: Coal Company Insolvency and
the Erosion of Federal Law, 71 Stanford L. Rev. 879 (2019) (documenting coal
companies’ use of bankruptcy process to evade environmental and worker
protections).
87
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on it in a private equity takeout or from too much debt incurred in buying
another company.88 And, of course, companies exist now and pay
dividends to stockholders that have shirked their duties to pensioners,
communities, and creditors.89
And when risk-taking led by investors goes wrong, the investor
class has been the beneficiary of huge government subsidies, even while
others suffering harm (such as homeowners during the financial crisis)
received far less government wealth. The United States government has
bailed out the financial sector repeatedly, with support varying from cash
infusions to liquidity supplied by the Federal Reserve. Recent history
includes the Savings and Loan Crisis of the late 1980s and early 1990s,
through the market meltdown in 1987, to the Financial Crisis in 2009.
And even during the pandemic, the predominant amount of bail-out
funds and Federal Reserve liquidity went to big business itself. These
bailouts understate the support the federal government has given to
equity investors, because the Federal Reserve has continuously acted to
prop up the stock market through interest rate changes and open market
operations.
A core assumption of Easterbrook and Fischel is that the market
generally prices risk well, and that is a reason to trust it, and to allow its
forces to act on corporations. But, this history of bailouts demonstrate
that financial markets are not an adequate protection for corporate
stakeholders and society against the dangers of speculation and

E.g., Danielle D’Onfro, Companies as Commodities, 48 Fl. St. U. L. Rev.
1 (2020) (collecting examples of private equity and other investors increasing leverage
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(describing failures at Toys R Us and other companies after private equity firms
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overreaching. The efficient capital markets hypothesis (“ECMH”) is not
a promise that that the market is right at any time, only a theory that
says that it is extremely difficult to build a portfolio that will durably
outperform a market driven by the collective estimates of current values
of all trading investors. The current stock market is not right in some
fundamental sense, and markets have proven themselves capable of
blinding themselves to obvious risks, and to operating on the “greater fool
theory” until that no longer works.
The pressures that these trading markets create — such as their
demands that companies not have adequate reserves and to source
materials on the cheapest, but not most reliable and resilient basis —
often come to pass later. The companies are then blamed by the same
investors for lacking the cash and resiliency to weather a period of
adversity, with the investors of course acknowledging no responsibility
for a state of affairs their own desires encouraged. The pandemic
illustrates exactly that sort of behavior, and also illustrates that
institutional investors, whose own interests in short-term returns is
different from that of their investors’ in durable returns — pose
stakeholder and societal risks of their own that demand a regulatory
response.
We favor vibrant stock markets. We favor vibrant competition. But
history has shown that depending on powerful economic interests to act
in a manner that is socially responsible, that does not externalize their
costs of business to others, and that creates shared prosperity is naïve.
A philosophy of corporate law that simultaneously exalts stockholder
interests and subordinates the interests of other stakeholders, and sits
aside a desire to return to an era when there were no environmental laws,
no minimum wage law, no maximum hour law, no worker safety laws,
and no protections against invidious discrimination is not a recipe for a
win-win. It is recipe for a return to a benighted past, a torn social fabric,
and the destruction of our planet.
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IV.

Conclusion

This is not the place for us to suggest a complete program for
reversing what we see as two generations of erosion in our nation’s social
fabric. In other work, each of us has done so. 90
But we do venture this. The idea that making societally-important
corporations govern more to the whims of the stock market would be a
win-win for investors, other corporate stakeholders, and our society as a
whole has emerged, as an empirical matter, to be implausible.
Easterbrook and Fischel, at bottom, failed to contend with the real world
realities that allow investors — especially intermediaries like
institutional investors who are agents for others — to profit by shifting
distributions to themselves and costs to workers, creditors, consumers,
and taxpayers.
Not only that, although they said other stakeholders should look to
other bodies of law for protection, the intellectual and political movement
they helped lead systematically rolled back those protections and
undermined the institutions, such as the NLRB and EPA, that enforced
them. And, their arguments ignored the reality that corporations had
been encouraged to, and have, used their entrusted capital to erode those
protections, and to influence elected officials toward views adverse to the
interests of workers, consumers, and the environment. Finally, they did
not anticipate that the globalization of their economic views that favored
E.g., Strine, Kovvali & Williams, supra note __; Aneil Kovvali, Essential
Businesses and Shareholder Value, 2021 U. Chi. Legal F. --- (forthcoming); Leo E.
Strine, Jr., Restoration: The Role Stakeholder Governance Must Play in Recreating
a Fair and Sustainable American Economy – A Reply to Professor Rock, 76 Bus. Law.
397 (2021); Leo E. Strine, Jr., Toward Racial Equality: The Most Important Things
The Business Community Can Do, The CLS Blue Sky Blog (Nov. 2, 2020),
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equity capital over other stakeholders, without corresponding protections
for other stakeholders, would accelerate a reversal of the equalizing
effects of the New Deal/European Social democratic approach. 91
For sure, the implementation of the Friedman-Reagan vision, of
which Easterbrook and Fischer’s corporate law is a subsidiary but
important part, has created winners. But those winners are a sliver of
society, and a great deal of their gains have come from taking the share
of the pie that the New Deal/European social democratic approach had
ensured would be shared with the stakeholders most responsible for our
economy’s productivity: American workers. And the costs to taxpayers
and societies of other externalities — such as bailouts and unemployment
caused by burst financial bubbles and climate change caused by corporate
concealment of the risks of carbon — have been enormous and continue
to grow. No win-win, but a triumph of certain have’s, particularly
financial engineers, over the bulk of society. 92
Those genuinely committed to a market economy and democracy
should heed the lessons of history and the need for guarantees of fairness
and efficiency, which ensure that corporations are encouraged to make
money the right way, by producing products and services that create
sustainable value, net of externalities and through the respectful
treatment of all their stakeholders. Realizing that does not require a
revolution, it simply requires a restoration and committing to the hard
work of extending the shared values that worked to create widespread
prosperity in the U.S. and our market allies to a globalizing world
economy.
A global new deal, not a benighted return to the 19th Century, is
what is needed, and that includes giving corporations space to create
wealth the right way, and to resist stock market pressures to divert from
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that mission to increase short-term stock prices, at the expense of other
stakeholders. That is what would help us return to a win-win economy.
Unless we want London to be foggy again, and to risk democracy
and social stability, then it is important not to repeat the mistakes of
history. The kind of harm to workers, the environment and the kind of
inequality that so called laissez faire produced cannot be survived. There
are billions of us now, and the planet and social harmony cannot survive
an economic system that rewards only a narrow class with prosperity and
drains the vast bulk of people responsible for societal wealth of a chance
for a dignified living and a better future. The way forward depends on
sustainable wealth creation that is based on more than forcing costs onto
third parties.
Although government regulation is an essential part of the solution,
giving corporate boards room to tend to groups other than shareholders
can also play a useful role. Given the failings of regulation, labor
markets, product markets, and capital markets, corporations that strive
only to maximize their stock price will predictably engage in socially
destructive behavior. It is only by considering the needs of other
constituencies that corporate boards can find and help implement true
win-wins for our nation and the world.
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